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0. Introduction 
In this paper, I present a case study of a linguistic debate conducted at the 
end of the 19th century in the Middle East, in the context of the disintegration 
of the Ottoman empire. The debate demonstrates that conservative linguistic 
ideas can form the basis for quite revolutionary political ideas. In the long 
run, however, these revolutionary political ideas were in turn undermined by 
this linguistic conservatism. Around the end of the 19th century, Christian 
intellectuals sought to challenge prevailing confessional identities by promot-
ing a secular Arab identity based on a common language and history. In order 
to achieve this, they relied heavily on fushā, the codified variety of Arabic 
that had been in place since the 10th century, which they estimated necessary 
for maintaining the bond between contemporary speakers of Arabic and their 
cultural and literary heritage. As a consequence of their revolutionary politi-
cal position, these intellectuals were strongly opposed to the creation of a 
new Arabic standard language. However, by doing so, they promoted a reli-
gious language to the level of a national standard language (Holt 1996). 
I will first describe some general features of variability in Arabic, in par-
ticular the difference in linguistic prestige between fushā and non-fushā va-
rieties. This specific situation, it will be argued, is related to the fact that the 
norms for written language use have remained virtually unchanged and un-
challenged since the codification of fushā in the 10th century. I will then focus 
on the polemical debates that were triggered by the proposals of certain intel-
lectuals to create one (or more) new standard languages. The paper concludes 
with an analysis of the political implications of the different positions taken 
in this linguistic debate.  
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1. The general setting: variability in Arabic and linguistic prestige  
Arabic is the official standard language of all the 22 member states of the 
Arab League. These include, first of all, a group of states that have tradition-
ally been identified as Arab: the countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya), the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq), the 
Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates and Yemen), and last but not least the Palestinian Authority. Less 
well known members include Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia and the 
Comoro Islands. All these countries accepted Arabic as their national and 
official standard language. The Comoros, Somalia and Mauritania also 
granted an official status to other languages, either as official or as national 
language. Iraq recognized Kurdish as an official language in the Kurdish 
Autonomous Region.  
In addition, Arabic is also the liturgical language of Islam. The Koran was 
revealed in Arabic and in a number of Koranic verses this is explicitly re-
ferred to. From an orthodox point of view, the Koran is therefore untranslat-
able. All over the world, Muslims are expected to say their prayers and recite 
the Koran in Arabic, regardless their actual mastery of the language.  
In this context, the term Arabic obviously refers to the codified and stan-
dardized variety, which is in Arabic referred to as al-‘arabīyah al-fasīhah or 
al-‘arabīyah al-fushā. In English, this term is usually translated as Classical 
Arabic or Modern Standard Arabic, but literally it means ‘eloquent Arabic’ 
(the feminine adjective al-fasīhah) or ‘the most eloquent Arabic’ (fushā, a 
feminine superlative of fasīh).  
Apart from al-fushā, a wide gamut of spoken varieties of Arabic is used 
in a diversity of contexts. In Arabic, all varieties other than fushā are referred 
to by means of generalizing labels like ‘āmmīyah (literally: ‘the language of 
the common people’ or ‘the common language’), dāriğah (lit.: ‘the common 
or the current language’), or lahğah (lit.: ‘dialect’). Depending on the context 
in which these terms are used, they can either be translated as ‘vernacular’, 
‘colloquial’, ‘dialect’, or ‘variety’. The use of such collective labels to de-
scribe all varieties other than fushā suggests that their basic common charac-
teristic is precisely the fact that they all deviate from the standard, and 
thereby these terms draw attention away from the tremendous amount of 
variability that is actually covered by them. Furthermore, they also suggest 
that all non-fushā varieties have the same status, that of nonprestigious collo-
quials. Again, this does not do full justice the actual variability that can be 
witnessed on the ground. Although many non-fushā varieties may indeed be 
considered ‘vernaculars’, ‘colloquials’, or ‘dialects’, others actually do enjoy 
LINGUISTIC CONSERVATISM AS THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL REVOLUTION? 
 
 81
                                                
quite a lot of prestige and may be used in far more speech contexts (and also 
in more prestigious ones) than would be expected1. On a local level, many 
varieties, mostly those of urban origin, also function as local or regional pres-
tige forms. This means that speakers of other varieties will often try to imitate 
them in contexts where they assume that their own vernacular will not be 
understood or is not appropriate. Because of the political and cultural domi-
nance of the capital, in many Arab states the variety spoken by the urban 
classes in the capital functions as the national prestige form. 
Cairene Arabic, for instance, is not just a locally prestigious variety, but 
may also be considered as the Egyptian national standard2 and furthermore 
enjoys a lot of prestige on a pan-Arab level. Because of the city’s role as 
Egypt’s primary political, economic and administrative center, Cairene Ara-
bic has come to represent the ‘Egyptian dialect’ (al-‘āmmīyah al-misrīyah) or 
‘Egyptian Arabic’ (al-‘arabīyah al-misrīyah). Language schools for non-
native speakers of Arabic that offer the option ‘Egyptian Arabic’ in their cur-
ricula, mostly teach Cairene Arabic. It is the variety most widely used in 
films, soap operas, ‘lighter’ television and radio programs, and broadcasted 
interviews. For a long time, the Egyptian capital was considered the major 
cultural and political center of the entire Arab world. Many important news-
papers were published in Cairo, and many of the films and soap operas pro-
duced there circulated (and still circulate) all over the Arab world. Many 
Egyptians worked as expatriate teachers in other Arab countries. As a result, 
Cairene Arabic is nowadays widely understood and is considered a prestig-
ious variety in the entire Arab world. These cultural and socio-political ob-
servations explain why most Egyptians stick to their own variety in interac-
tions with other Arabs, while, conversely, non-Egyptian Arabs tend to con-
verge to Egyptian linguistic features in conversations with Egyptians. (Many 
Maghribians also show a tendency to do so in informal encounters with peo-
ple from the Middle East who are not Egyptians.) The above also offers an 
 
1 For further discussion see Haeri (1996), Holes (1986, 1995), Ibrahim (1986). 
2 The use of the term ‘standard’ should not be confused with ‘standard language’. Cairene 
Arabic lacks some fundamental characteristics associated with standard languages: it does 
not have any official status, and even though it is sometimes also used as a written medium 
(mainly in personal letters, non-fushā poetry, and cartoons), it remains basically used as an 
oral medium. However, it does share with standard languages a certain degree of codification 
(because of its limited use as a written medium, and because it is taught to non-native stu-
dents of Arabic in several language schools), and its high degree of (covert) linguistic pres-
tige due to its association with urbanity and the capital. 
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explanation for the fact that in Egypt many local non-fushā characteristics 
have made their way to formal speech levels3. In news broadcasts, for in-
stance, the alveolar fricative /ğ/ (fushā) is systematically realized as a velar 
plosive /g/ (Cairene/Egyptian), so that /g/ has become part of fushā in Egypt 
(with the exception of recitations of the Koran). In most other Arab countries 
the use of non-fushā tends to be suppressed at formal speech levels. 
Other regionally prestigious non-fushā varieties include the variety spo-
ken by Sunni Muslims in Bahrain4, the Muslim Baghdadi variety in Iraq, and 
the urban varieties of Aleppo and Damascus in Syria. The linguistic prestige 
of these varieties is related to the social prestige of dominant (religious, sec-
tarian, socio-economic and/or ethnic) groups in society. Their prestige is 
therefore very concrete. As it is not overtly recognized, however, it remains 
‘covert’.  
Because fushā is essentially a modernized classical language, it cannot be 
associated with any particular social or regional group in the Arab world. 
Fushā doubtlessly possesses a lot of prestige, because of its associations with 
Islam and pan-Arab nationalism and because it is the language of a rich cul-
tural and literary heritage, but its prestige is mostly of an abstract kind. Holes 
(1995) observes that in most oral and face-to-face interactions, the ‘covert’ 
prestige of specific non-fushā varieties is usually more relevant than the pres-
tige of fushā: 
The linguistic prestige conferred by the oral use of MSA, or something like it, is un-
deniable, but it is an ‘overt’, non-local type of prestige, inappropriate and irrelevant 
to most of the speech contexts encountered in daily life. (Holes 1995: 272) 
In fact, two sets of linguistic norms exist side by side, one regulating written 
and official language use and another for daily conversations. This is a con-
sequence of the fact that the norms for written language use remained basi-
cally unchanged since the 10th century. Once these norms of fushā had been 
established, they were preserved by a small elite of religious specialists, the 
‘ulamā’. The fact that fushā was only used by a small group of literates helps 
to explain why it was used in such a relatively homogenous way (Holt, 1996: 
14). It should hence not come as a surprise that the linguistic norms of fushā 
 
3 Mazraani remarks that “Egyptians feel confident and proud of their dialect, and rarely 
change it in making speeches or in cross-dialectal conversations, retaining many Egyptian 
localisms which are understood outside Egypt” (Mazraani 1997: 194). 
4 For an elaborate discussion of the sociolinguistic situation in Bahrain, see Holes & Ingham 
(1987), Holes (1995). 
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only came to be questioned at the moment when larger segments of the popu-
lation became involved in the educational process, and when written texts 
became available to a wider public through printing. The majority of the Arab 
intellectuals, however, firmly rejected linguistic reform proposals, which 
nevertheless kept appearing regularly since the middle of the 19th century. 
The remainder of this paper deals with the debates triggered by these re-
form proposals: a number of polemical exchanges in which the desirability of 
changing the linguistic norms for written language use is discussed. An 
analysis of this fushā-‘āmmīyah debate can provide us with deeper insights 
into how the observed discrepancy between overt and covert linguistic norms 
came about, enhancing our understanding of the linguistic and social, politi-
cal and religious considerations underlying the majority position that linguis-
tic norms should not be changed. 
 
2. The fushā –‘āmmīyah debate  
From the 19th century until the 1960s, there has always been a minority of 
Arab intellectuals who stood up to defend the idea of adapting linguistic 
norms to the actual speech situation. This debate is generally known as the 
fushā-‘āmmīyah debate. Intellectuals, linguists, politicians, journalists, as 
well as people from the public wrote thousands of pages expressing their 
opinion on the question. Many lectures were devoted to it, and the theme was 
the topic of many conversations.  
My main point of departure is that all this constitutes a ‘language ideo-
logical debate’ (Blommaert 1999). This means that in the debate, much more 
is at stake than language alone: the social, political, and religious considera-
tions of the participants are as important as the linguistic ones. Such a view-
point implies that the debate is strongly interrelated with the historical con-
text in which it was conducted, and with other political, social and religious 
developments in the area. Both the content of the proposal to standardize the 
spoken language (referred to as al-da‘wah ’ilā al-‘āmmīyah, litt: ‘propaganda 
for ‘āmmīyah’) and the arguments put forward to defend al-fushā strongly 
differed depending on the period in which the discussion took place and the 
participants in the debate. 
In the first debate, which was opened in the Lebanese journal Al-
Muqtataf in 1881, the position in favor of the use of ‘āmmīyah boiled down 
to the unification and standardization of the different spoken varieties into 
one new standard language that should be used by all the Arabs (see below). 
A similar position was adopted by the Lebanese Iskandar Ma’lūf in 1902, and 
later by the Lebanese linguist Anis Frayhah in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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In Egypt, British and German orientalists like Willmore, Spitta, and Will-
cocks got involved in the debate from the 1890s onwards. They defended the 
idea of standardizing Cairene Arabic into a new Egyptian standard language. 
From that time on, many Arab intellectuals believe that the fushā-‘āmmīyah 
debate was started by Western imperialists in order to destroy fushā Arabic, 
as part of a larger attempt to undermine Arab identity. Defending al-fasīhah 
hence took on an anti-colonialist character. Proposals to replace fushā with 
non-fushā varieties are since then generally associated with the promotion of 
one particular local variety and with colonial ploys against Arab and Muslim 
identity. These ideas are still very much alive in the Arab world even today.  
This association of linguistic reform proposals with localism was further 
strengthened by other proposals by Egyptian intellectuals in the 1920s and 
1930s to use standardized Egyptian Arabic as the national language of Egypt. 
These proposals had strong Egyptian nationalist connotations, and they coin-
cided with the development of a typically Egyptian literature, archaeological 
discoveries like that of the grave of Tutankhamen, and a general Pharaonist 
mood which was distinctly anti-Arab.  
 
3.  The historical context of the debate  
The fushā-‘āmmīyah debate began in 1881 with an article which was enti-
tled “Al-luġah al-‘arabīyah wa al-nağāh” (‘The Arabic language and suc-
cess’), written by Ya‘qūb Sarrūf and Fāris Nimr. The two authors published 
their article in a periodical Al-Muqtataf, which they edited since 1876 in Bei-
rut.  
As far as I know, this was the first time that the linguistic difference be-
tween the spoken and written language (al-luġah al-mahkiyah wa al-luġah 
al-maktūbah) was presented as a linguistic ‘problem’ in need of a suitable 
‘solution’. The difference between the written and the spoken language had 
been around since the 10th century, when fushā was codified, and throughout 
history Arab intellectuals had always been aware of the existence of these 
differences. Ibn Khaldun already referred to them in the 14th century. Around 
the middle of the 19th century, intellectuals like Rifa’at Al-Tahtawi, Mu-
hammad ‘Abduh, Butrus Al-Bustani, and Ahmad Faris Al-Shidyaq also paid 
attention to the issue. These differences, however, were not thought of as 
problematic.  
It is not an accident that the debate started precisely at the end of the 19th 
century, after a number of important, strongly interrelated developments had 
taken place in the Ottoman Empire, to which the Middle East belonged at that 
time. These developments can be characterized as modernization, westerniza-
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tion and secularization, and must be situated in the political context of the 
beginning disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of these devel-
opments, the use of fushā was no longer restricted to a small elite of religious 
specialists, and its number of speakers as well as the number of the domains 
in which it was used (journals, texts translated from European languages, and 
so on) drastically increased. This is the context in which the issue of the 
modernization and the adaptation of the norms of the written language im-
posed itself and the fushā-‘āmmīyah debate emerged.  
Of particular importance were the modernization and secularization of 
education, the translation movement and the introduction of print technology. 
New developments in education resulted in the emergence of a new Arabic-
speaking intelligentsia, who had received their education in Arabic. They 
became increasingly aware of recent political and social developments in 
Europe (the French Revolution, the development of the first constitutions, the 
rise of nationalist movements, etc.), and also of the major scientific and tech-
nical achievements of the time. This was due to direct contacts with Western-
ers who had settled in the Middle East (missionaries, traders, diplomats, etc.), 
and to the translation movement, which had started in the middle of the 19th 
century. Also around the same time, the highlights of classical Arabic litera-
ture, as well as important classical scientific, historical and linguistic works, 
became for the first time available through print. Toward the end of the 19th 
century, a number of private publishing houses were founded that started 
publishing periodicals. These periodicals were an important medium for the 
popularization of scientific knowledge, and they hosted all kinds of debates 
concerning the relation between modernization, westernization and seculari-
zation. This is the context in which the fushā-‘āmmīyah debate should be 
situated.  
 
4. The debate in Al-Muqtataf 1881–1882 
In the remainder of this paper, I will present a micro-analysis of one sub-
debate of the larger fushā-‘āmmīyah debate, a sequence of 11 articles which 
appeared in Al-Muqtataf between November 1881 and July 1882, starting 
with a contribution by Sarrūf and Nimr. This sequence of articles clearly 
forms a bound unit: the debate was explicitly ‘opened’ and ‘closed’ by the 
editors of the journal, Sarrūf and Nimr, and each article constituted an ex-
plicit reaction against the one(s) that preceded it. The result is a debate in the 
most literal sense of the word. (It was also published in the section entitled 
“Debate and correspondence”.) 
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 In their article, Nimr and Sarruf observe that success and progress are far 
more widespread in the West than in the Arab world. The main reason for 
this, they claim, is the fact that in the West there exists no difference between 
the written and the spoken language. As a consequence, science and science 
books are accessible to all classes of society. This is contrasted with the lan-
guage situation in the Arabic world, where a wide discrepancy can be ob-
served between the spoken language and the written language, which is, also 
called the book language (luġat al-kitābah). If the Arabs want to keep pace 
with the West, this situation needs to be rectified as soon as possible. Sarrūf 
and Nimr consider three possible solutions. A first solution would be to re-
place Arabic with another language, but this is immediately dismissed as to-
tally undesirable. Another option would be to replace the written language 
with the spoken language. This solution is presented as nearly inevitable, as 
one is forced to “[follow] the laws of nature that make languages change with 
the change of time” (Sarrūf and Nimr 1881: 353). It is the third solution, 
however, the replacement of the spoken language by the written language, 
which is considered “the noblest, safest and most beneficial solution” (Sarrūf 
and Nimr 1881: 353). At the end of the article, they invite all Arab intellectu-
als “who strive for the welfare of the fatherland (al-watan)” (Sarrūf and Nimr 
1881: 354) to express their opinion and join the debate. 
In the subsequent issues of Al-Muqtataf ten reactions were published. It 
became a debate of all against one: all the participants except one defended 
the third solution, the replacement of the spoken language, al-‘āmmīyah, with 
the written language, al-fasīhah. The anonymous defender of the standardiza-
tion of the spoken language does not reveal his real name, but writes under 
the pen name Al-Mumkin, which means The Possible. He states that he chose 
this name because he believes in the feasibility of his proposal, a position 
which is heavily refuted by the other participants.  
 
5. One standard language for one linguistic community 
Before entering into their differences of opinion, I want to point out one 
issue on which there exists a consensus among the participants to the debate. 
Notwithstanding their differences of opinion, all the debaters are strongly 
committed to the idea that there exists something like an Arab community, 
and they agree that this community is first of all a linguistic community, and 
hence that it needs one common standard language.  
 All the participants are strongly committed to this idea of linguistic unity. 
In the following quote, Al-Yāziğī refuses even to consider the possibility of 
standardizing more than one folk language (luġah ‘āmmīyah): 
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If we deemed [the solution of the standardization of the folk languages] correct and 
intended [to apply] it: then which of the folk languages would we use, since between 
every language and its sister there is a difference in accent and lexicon that is not less 
than the difference between each of them and al-luġah al-fasīhah. So whichever we 
chose of these languages to write in, it will lead us to the same [situation] we flee of. 
As such, in the frame of this pursuit, all the languages of the countries/regions would 
have to be transformed into one language (luġah wāhidah). (Al-Yāziğī 1881: 404)  
The following statement also indicates the extent to which linguistic unity is 
taken for granted, because it discusses only the idea of unifying the different 
folk languages into one new language: 
the folk languages are clearly very different [from each other]. To unify them into 
one language of them would be very difficult. If we would presume that it is possi-
ble, than it would still be much better to revert them to the authentic language [e.g. 
fushā]. (Society 1882: 553)  
Another participant, Dāġir, states that if one of the folk languages would be 
chosen as the standard language for all the Arabs, it would most likely not be 
accepted by the speakers of the other folk languages: 
Each of these languages has a different accent and lexicon, in the same way as a for-
eign language [has them] in comparison to other languages. If it were possible (hypo-
thetically) to write a book in the Syrian language, for instance, would the Iraqi bene-
fit from it? Would the Maghribian not laugh at it? Would the Egyptian not mock it? 
The dialect of which Syrian province would we have to use? Or rather, which city, 
which village or even which neighborhood? Since Al-Mumkin surely knows that in 
Syria itself there are several folk languages that are mutually different in the same 
way as each of them differs from al-luġah al-fasīhah. (Dāġir 1882: 557) [round 
brackets original] 
Like the others, Dāġir does not even take into account the possibility of stan-
dardizing Syrian for the Syrians, Iraqi for the Iraqi’s, and so on. Al-Mumkin, 
the lonely defender of the standardization of al-‘āmmīyah, also has a single 
common language in mind, but one which is based on the existing spoken 
languages:  
Concerning his opinion about using the folk language for [written purposes]: despite 
the difficulty of the difference between the dialects of the Syrians, the Egyptians, the 
Iraqis and the Maghribians, and despite the fact that this is a real difficulty, as is as-
serted by [Al-Yāziğī], this is what happened to Arabic itself, not to say that it also 
happened to other languages. Does he not see that correct Arabic (al-‘arabīyah al-
sahīhah) is a collection of the different languages of the tribes of the Arabs, and that 
the numerous names for the same meaning are a convincing indication that it is a col-
lection of the languages of different tribes? This is obvious for the one who has the 
slightest knowledge of linguistics. If the scholars of the first centuries of the Hijra 
were successful in the unification of ancient Arabic (al-‘arabīyah al-qadīmah), de-
spite their limited means, then contemporary scholars should be able to unify and 
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standardize folk Arabic (al-‘arabīyah al-‘āmmīyah), especially since the means for 
this have increased drastically.’ (Al-Mumkin 1882a: 494)  
Despite these authors’ acute awareness of the existing differences between 
the different spoken languages, the idea of standardizing more than one spo-
ken language into a written language does not occur to them. This clearly 
illustrates how commonsensical the idea is of one Arab linguistic community 
with one standard language. Syrians (an ethnonym which includes the present 
inhabitants of Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon), Iraqi’s, Egyptians and 
Moroccans are all considered Arabs. The issue, in this stage of the debate, is 
not so much whether the Arabs do need one standard language or not, but 
rather the question which variety of Arabic ought to be selected as the stan-
dard language. This was markedly different in the debate that went on in 
Egypt during the 1920s and 1930s, where the primary issue was the creation 
Egyptian Arabic standard exclusively for the Egyptians.  
 
6 Language and identity construction  
As I already mentioned, all the debaters except one are convinced that al-
fasīhah is the only variety of Arabic valuable enough to fulfil the function of 
common standard language for all the Arabs. Only Al-Mumkin defends the 
creation of a new standard language out of the existing spoken varieties. His 
proposal to unify and standardize the spoken language, al-‘āmmīyah, encoun-
tered strong opposition from the other debaters. I think that this strong oppo-
sition was partly caused by genuine linguistic conservatism. On many occa-
sions Al-Mumkin’s opponents praise the linguistic superiority of al-fasīhah, 
arguing that it has precise grammatical rules and a rich lexicon that can easily 
be expanded by means of morphological devices. They also mention its 
adaptability, its rich style, and so on. Al-luġah al-‘āmmīyah, in contrast, is 
considered too diverse and limited to certain domains of society. It is also 
associated with ignorance.  
Linguistic conservatism, however, was not the only reason behind this 
staunch defense of al-fasīhah. The opponents of the use of ‘āmmīyah wanted 
to construct an Arab identity that was not exclusively based on language, but 
which also assigned a central place to Arab history. This history was accessi-
ble via the rich cultural and literary heritage, which was almost entirely writ-
ten down in al-fasīhah. Consequently, al-fasīhah had to remain in place to 
maintain this bond with Arab history. If linguistic norms would be drastically 
changed, as Al-Mumkin’s had proposed, then the Arab literary heritage 
would no longer be accessible to contemporary readers. The relevance of this 
literary and cultural heritage is not called into question, except by Al-
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Mumkin, who suggests that it is only of historical interest and that most of 
the books in Arabic from the previous centuries could easily be disposed of. 
As such, he chose squarely for the future.  
Most, maybe all, of these intellectuals were Christians5, and so they 
wanted to construct an identity that could be shared by Christians and Mus-
lims alike. This may explain another striking characteristic of the debate, 
namely the lack of any religious argumentation. In the entire sequence of 
articles, religion is hardly ever referred to, and the linguistic argumentation 
that is developed is entirely secular. Al-fasīhah constitutes a bond that unites 
all contemporary Arabs around their common past; it is not considered a reli-
gious language that unites Muslims as believers, or unites the individual be-
liever with God. This is all the more significant since the primordial impor-
tance of Arabic as the liturgical language of Islam is usually taken for 
granted. On the other hand, the authors undertake no attempts to explicitly 
secularize the Arabic language. The bond between al-fasīhah and Islam is not 
discussed and as a result it is also not dismantled. The authors were keenly 
aware of the central role al-fasīhah plays in the religious life of Muslims as 
their liturgical language. They probably considered it more appropriate to 
defend al-fasīhah as the common standard language, since they knew that 
they would otherwise not be able to rally sufficient support from Muslims6.  
Authors like Holt (1996), Haddad (1970) and Philipp (1979) suggested 
that it was not accidental that Christian intellectuals were the first to focus on 
forms of identity other than denominational ones, in particular secular ones, 
based for instance on language, culture and/or history. In the beginning po-
litical disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, these Christians saw an oppor-
tunity to shake of the statute of ‘protected minority’ which they had tradition-
ally occupied in Islamic society. They tried to achieve this by promoting non-
confessional forms of identity, as an alternative to the confessional ones that 
up until then had been the primary forms of identity. They instead tried to 
promote a common secular identity that would suit both Muslims and Chris-
tians, and that was based on the common Arabic language and common Arab 
history. As said, they needed al-fasīhah in order to construct such an identity.  
 
5 Ya'qūb Sarrūf, Fāris Nimr, Khalīl Al-Yāziğī, As’ad Dāġir and Mitrī Qandalaft were Chris-
tians. AL-Mumkin, H.H. and the Damascene Literary Society could not be identified.  
6 Another reason for this striking absence of religious argumentation is probably the general 
secular orientation of Al-Muqtataf, the journal in which the debate took place. 
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In resorting to al-fasīhah, a language that had been kept intact by Islam, 
as the basis for their secular Arab nationalism, these Christian intellectuals in 
fact promoted a liturgical language to the level of a state and national lan-
guage (Holt 1996). In doing so, they quite paradoxically also laid the basis 
for a form of Arab nationalism in which both Arabism and Islam were closely 
intertwined, which was to become dominant in the 1940s and 1950s.  
Al-Mumkin’s position, in contrast, entailed a complete rupture with the 
past. He was the first one to explicitly bring up the issue of religion, and from 
his discussion it appears that he sought to relegate it to a separate domain of 
society. This can be deduced, for example, from his belief that the study of 
religious books should exclusively be left to religious specialists. For Al-
Mumkin, it is of little importance whether or not nonspecialist believers are 
able to read and understand their religious books directly, and consequently, 
there is no need to translate them into the new standard language. He cites the 
Greek Orthodox, Latin Christians, and non-Arab Muslims as examples of 
religious communities who do not use their own language(s) for liturgical 
purposes, but Classical Greek, Latin, and fushā Arabic instead. It is as if by 
citing these examples, he wants to demonstrate that this situation should not 
be considered dramatic:  
The books on religion remain as they are because the custodians of religion (’umanā’ 
al-dīn) have the task to study and to explain them. This is the main part of their sci-
ence if not all of it. The Muslims have the example of the Latin and the Greek Or-
thodox Christians, since the Latin Christians read their Gospels in Latin and the 
Greek Orthodox in Greek and of the Persian and Turkish Muslims since they read the 
Koran in Arabic. (Al-Mumkin 1882a: 495)  
The fact that Al-Mumkin does not propose to translate religious books does 
not emanate from some kind of religious conservatism, but rather from his 
refusal to assign to religion a central place in society. This is exemplified by 
his discussion of jurisprudence books. In his opinion these can easily be dis-
posed of, since modern society should be regulated by secular law (nizām) 
and not by religious jurisprudence (fiqh). The importance Al-Mumkin attrib-
utes to this secular law is also illustrated by his insistence that it should be 
written down in the folk language, so that it will be accessible to everybody 
who needs it to defend himself.  
The jurisprudence books (kutub al-fiqh) can be disposed of in favor of the constitu-
tion (nizām). Nothing prevents us from writing the [modern secular] law in the folk 
language (luġat al-‘āmmah) so that [both] the elite and the folk people understand it. 
In my opinion this is necessary with good cause, and if not, the folk person will not 
[be able to] claim something he does not fully understand. (Al-Mumkin 1882a: 495)  
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The comparison of Al-Mumkin’s position with that of his opponents illus-
trates the paradoxical nature of the latter. Even if their linguistic conservative 
position was related to the revolutionary political project of promoting a 
secular identity in a religiously based society and of encouraging the emanci-
pation and political participation of confessional minorities, in the long run it 
maintained the relation between Arabic and the Islamic religious heritage. 
We can only wonder whether this paradox would have been avoided if Al-
Mumkin’s proposition would have been accepted, which promoted a linguis-
tic identity for the Arabs that was not related to the past but firmly rooted in 
modernity. However, his position never gained sufficient support to impose 
its own logic on the course of events. 
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